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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the sources of the resistance to liberalization in the United States and its ef-
fects on the political climate in which the WTO member nations continue to pursue liberalization.  
This analysis utilizes the findings of mainstream economic theory to argue that opposition to the 
WTO is rooted in rational economic decision-making. A majority-voting model is used to more 
formally illustrate that this rational decision making affects the composition of public opposition 
and results in a resistance to liberalization by a majority of the populace, even if a majority will 
benefit from the movement toward free trade.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy 
implications of the theoretical analysis focusing on the importance of Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance and continued multilateral liberalization through the WTO. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
he November 1999 Inter-Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle was meant to 
serve as the beginning of the Millennium round of trade negotiations for the members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  Even before protesters scaled buildings and smashed windows in Seattle, 
the WTO was under scrutiny in the U.S. and abroad from both the left and the right.  Groups such as trade unions, 
NGOs, and grassroots organizations spoke out against the WTO on issues ranging from globalization to labor condi-
tions and environmental policies, while right wing organizations called for less open boarders for goods, services, 
and immigration.  However, at the time, many mainstream economists did not take this opposition seriously, dis-
missing it as left-wing or right-wing politics or a lack of understanding of the theory of comparative advantage and 
gains from trade.   
 
Upon further inspection, this reaction by economists seems unwarranted.  While those protesting the WTO 
meeting in Seattle represented a minority of the U.S. public, there exists evidence that most Americans shared some 
of their concerns.  A 2001 study by the Institute for International Economics found that a majority of Americans 
surveyed do understand the benefits of international trade but are concerned about its costs, particularly the loss of 
jobs and effects on wages (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).  Specifically, “Americans display a quantitatively accurate 
appreciation of both the benefits and the costs of liberalization but that a consistent plurality or majority tend to 
weigh the costs more heavily than the benefits” (Scheve and Slaughter, p. 13).  In addition, the authors found that 
most Americans surveyed believe that the current pace of liberalization is too fast. As a result, “for every American 
who self-identifies with free trade, nearly nine others support interventionist trade policies.” (Scheve and Slaughter, 
p.28)  
 
In this paper, I examine the sources of the resistance to liberalization in the United States and its effects on 
the political climate in which the WTO member nations continue to pursue liberalization. The next section utilizes 
the findings of mainstream economic theory to argue that opposition to the WTO is rooted in rational economic de-
cision making.  The following section uses a majority voting model to illustrate, more formally, that this rational 
T 
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decision making affects the composition of public support for liberalization and results in a resistance to liberaliza-
tion by a majority of the populace, even if a majority will benefit from it.  The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the policy implications of the theoretical analysis focusing on the importance of Trade Adjustment Assistance and 
continued multilateral liberalization through the WTO. 
 
2.  Rational Decision Making 
 
Mainstream economic theory predicts that the reduction of import tariffs and nontariff barriers will result in 
an increase in imports, a decrease in profits for import competing industries and a reduction in wages and a loss of 
jobs for workers in those industries.  As a result, it is rational for owners of capital and sector-specific jobs skills in 
domestic import competing industries to oppose policies aimed at lowering import tariffs.  Yet, with a majority of 
Americans opposing further liberalization, it is apparent that opposition extends beyond these producers and con-
sumers.  This is sometimes puzzling to mainstream economists, however, this paper will illustrate that such behavior 
is rooted in economically rational decision-making and should not be dismissed as ignorance or political reaction-
ism. 
 
Despite their understanding of the costs and benefits of liberalization, it is true that Americans lack infor-
mation about specific trade policies.  A 1994 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that “nearly 40 percent of Ameri-
cans said that they did not know enough to evaluate whether the Uruguay Round of the GATT would benefit the 
United States” (Scheve and Slaughter, p. 42). Since individuals lack this specific information, they fall back on their 
general understanding of the costs and benefits of liberalization when evaluating their position on a specific policy.   
 
However, this lack of information does not necessarily result in the resistance to liberalization.  Survey evi-
dence illustrates that Americans do understand that the overall gains from liberalization are greater than the losses.  
Instead, opposition stems from the fact that Americans tend to weight the losses more heavily than the gains (Scheve 
and Slaughter 2001).  This asymmetry in weighing gain and loss is consistent with psychological evidence about 
individual decision-making.  Psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1984) found that individual decision making is 
characterized by loss aversion which means that the utility received from gaining an object is less than the disutility 
of losing it.  Therefore, an individual frames a decision in terms of gains and losses and weighs the loss greater than 
they would a gain of an equal magnitude.   This concept is exhibited in daily economic decisions and is a rational 
part of economic decision making.  
 
This avoidance of loss extends beyond individual decision-making and is also rational for a government de-
termining trade policy.  This concept is most prominently presented by Corden (1974), who asserted that it is ration-
al for government policy decisions to be based on what he named the “conservative welfare function.”  At the core 
of the conservative social welfare function is the principle that a government should avoid a considerable reduction 
in the income of a particular group both out of government self interest and equity concerns. Specifically, it states 
that: “1) It is considered unfair for any policy to substantially and arbitrarily injure one party for the benefit of oth-
ers. 2) The existence of such a principle provides a degree of “social insurance” to all members of the public against 
unexpected losses of income. 3) The policy buys social peace by avoiding discontent” (Corden, p. 174).   Based on 
Corden’s work, even if a government does not display social concern for those harmed by liberalization, it is still 
best off to avoid this loss in order to provide social insurance and “avoid discontent” among its electorate.   
 
Fortunately, there is a policy solution that will help to avoid discontent, provide social insurance, and lessen 
public resistance to liberalization.  While Americans understand that lowering tariffs will result in less expensive 
goods, they are bothered by the costs of job loss and lower wages.  Therefore, “opinions become more favorable 
toward liberalization when it is explicitly linked to adjustment assistance for workers” (Scheve and Slaughter, p. 9).  
This implies an important role for Trade Adjustment Assistance for workers as a part of future liberalization.  In 
addition, American opinion about liberalization is more favorable if our trading partners are also expected to liberal-
ize suggesting a continued U.S. commitment to cooperative multilateral liberalization through the WTO.  These pol-
icy implications will be discussed in the results section of this paper. 
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3.  Theoretical Analysis 
 
Given the rational basis for resistance to liberalization, this section presents a more formal analysis, using a 
median voter model to illustrate how the asymmetric weighing of loss and gain will translate into to resistance to 
liberalization.  
 
Mayer (1984) posits a median voter model that identifies the  specific winners and losers from liberaliza-
tion.  The model is a Heckscher-Ohlin small country model where two commodities (X1 and X2) are produced using 
two factors of production (L and K).  Markets are competitive, production functions are homogenous to degree one, 
and labor and capital are mobile between industries.  An individual’s labor and capital ownership are represented by 
Li and Ki respectively where i = 1, . . ,I,  assuming that Li = 1 and Ki>0 for all i. 
 
Mayer (1984) illustrates that given a symmetric factor ownership distribution, symmetric voting costs and 
symmetric voting probabilities, the unique equilibrium tariff level (one that cannot be voted out through majority 
voting) will be free trade.  In order for the equilibrium tariff to be something other than zero, one must assume there 
exists an asymmetry in factor ownership, voting costs, or voting probabilities.  
 
Mayer defines Di(ki,t) as the change in agent i’s real income resulting from a tariff decrease.  From his 
analysis of the model he finds the following expression for Di: 
 
 
where w^ is the percentage change in the wage, r^ is the percentage change in the return to capital, and p^ is the 
percentage change in price.  The variable kj represents the capital ownership of the individual for whom the current 
tariff rate is optimal.  The above equation provides the result that if agent i is relatively well (poorly) endowed with 
the factor that is used intensively in the production of the import good, he/she will lose (gain) from a tariff decrease.  
For example, a relatively capital abundant country will import labor intensive goods.  A tariff reduction on these 
goods will benefit individuals with a high level of capital ownership and harm individuals with a relatively low level 
of capital ownership.   
 
This portion of the model can be used to explain the source and policy implications of the current resistance 
to liberalization in the United States.  As a relatively capital abundant country, the U.S. has a tariff structure that is 
characterized by historically high tariffs on labor intensive imports.  The majority of the populace would benefit 
from unilateral lowering of these tariffs as consumers would face lower world prices on these goods, and the gains 
to consumers would outweigh the losses incurred by import competing domestic producers.  In Figure 1, D locus 
identifies the winners and losers from a tariff decrease given that tj is the prevailing tariff level.  Assume that there is 
some positive tariff level (tj), which is optimal for an agent with capital endowment k(ej).  Those with a factor own-
ership ratio less than k(ej) will gain from the tariff decrease, and those with a tariff level greater than k(ej) will lose.  
Therefore, a majority of the populace will benefit from a unilateral tariff decrease.   
 
The D locus represents the actual costs and benefits of a tariff reduction, however, the perceived benefits 
are less than the actual benefits due to the asymmetric weighing of loss and gain.  Once this aspect of individual 
decision-making is factored in, the reason for the resistance to liberalization becomes clear.  Assume that the is some 
additional cost of liberalization (α>0) that is perceived by the individual as a result of the additional weight placed 
on the income and wage losses caused by the tariff decrease.  The locus of perceived gains and losses from a tariff 
decrease is represented by D- α in Figure 1. 
 
Note that the perceived benefits line is not parallel to the actual benefits line due to assumptions about the 
difference in the magnitude of α for individuals with different levels of capital ownership.  Concerns about the costs 
of liberalization center around wage and job loss, and these concerns are greater among individuals with low capital 
ownership. Specifically, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that the opposition to liberalization tends to be negatively 
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correlated with worker education level and wage.  Assuming that low skill workers have a less than average capital 
ownership, α  
 
4.  Results And Policy Implications 
 
There are two major results of the above analysis.  First, the gains from liberalization are smaller when the 
individual decision making process is taken into consideration.  In particular, there is a perception that those losing 
from liberalization (low capital ownership end of the D locus) are hit particularly hard.  As a result, it is individually 
rational for those with the most to lose from liberalization to be involved in protest aimed at the WTO.  While this 
does not justify vandalism or violence, we should not be surprised by the existence of small, vocal and active pock-
ets of resistance. 
 
Second, it is rational, given the individual’s decision-making process, for this resistance to extend beyond 
these small pockets to a majority of Americans.  It is individually rational for most Americans to oppose liberaliza-
tion, even if the static gains from trade outweigh the costs, because they do not perceive a net benefit from it.  As 
shown in Figure 1, if α is sufficiently large, a majority of the populace will oppose liberalization, even if a majority 
would benefit from it. 
 
There are two major policy implications that follow from these results.  The first involves the role of do-
mestic government and trade adjustment policy.  At the lower end of the capital ownership scale are consumers who 
marginally gain from liberalization but are willing to pay slightly higher prices to protect against job loss and wage 
reduction for other workers.  However, “opinions become more favorable toward liberalization when it is explicitly 
linked to adjustment assistance for workers” (Scheve and Slaughter, p. 9).  Therefore, a government providing trade 
adjustment assistance will not only help integrate displaced workers back into the labor force, it will reduce the re-
sistance to liberalization by its populace.  
 
The results of such a policy can be seen in Figure 2.  Trade Adjustment Assistance defrays some of the 
costs of unemployment caused by liberalization, and it reduces public resistance to the liberalization process.  As-
sume that this per person benefit can be measured by the variable β and that the value of β 
low capital ownership.  Therefore, Trade Adjustment Assistance will shift the D – α curve up by β, increasing the 
number of individuals who support liberalization.   
 
A second policy implication involves the importance cooperative multilateral liberalization and the future 
of the WTO.  If a country engages in multilateral liberalization with its major trading partners, it will enjoy gains 
that result from the opening of foreign markets to domestic exports.  As a result, multilateral liberalization will result 
in increased benefits to domestic owners of K, who now have a larger market for their goods, and is likely to in-
crease their support for liberalization.  In addition, survey data provides evidence that more Americans support U.S. 
liberalization when trading partners are also required to liberalize (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).  Thus, multilateral 
liberalization provides both real economic benefits as well as perceived benefits when compared to unilateral libera-
lization. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates this comparison of the effects of unilateral and multilateral liberalization.  Assume that 
the additional benefits from multilateral liberalization can be represented by an individual net gain of χ.  Therefore, 
the net gain from a multilateral tariff decrease will be represented by the locus D - α + χ.  As compared to unilateral 
liberalization (the D - α line), more individuals will receive or perceive a net gain from liberalization.  As a result, a 
smaller percentage of the populace will oppose multilateral liberalization than unilateral liberalization and implying 
an important role for cooperative liberalization in removing protection in labor intensive import competing indus-
tries. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
While the analysis provided in this paper does not explain all resistance to the WTO, it uncovers some im-
portant themes and policy implications.  First, it is rational for a minority of citizens to protest further liberalization 
through the WTO.  While this does not justify vandalism or violence, we should not be surprised by the existence of 
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small, vocal and active pockets of resistance.  Second, it is rational, given the individual’s decision-making process, 
for this resistance to extend beyond these small pockets to a majority of Americans.  Due to the way we evaluate 
gain and loss and lack of complete information about specific policies, individuals fall back on general knowledge 
about liberalization and the asymmetric weighing of loss.  These results are consistent with the varying levels of 
resistance to trade liberalization through the WTO and will serve to impede the future progress of the WTO if left 
unrecognized.   
 
Therefore, WTO member nations cannot afford to ignore the resistance expressed by their citizens.  In-
stead, they must recognize the rationale of the opposition to WTO policies and take steps to uncover the source of 
resistance and come up with the appropriate policy solutions.  Specifically, these findings serve as a warning regard-
ing future WTO policy.  It is important to note that opposition does not only come from those losing from liberaliza-
tion but from those who understand the gains from trade but are concerned about the job loss and reduction of wages 
in some industries that result from tariff reduction.  This implies a role for the U.S. government in providing com-
pensation to those losing from liberalization.  For example, further liberalization must be combined with an expan-
sion of programs such as Trade Adjustment Assistance to workers subject to job loss as a result of liberalization.   
 
Finally, these results also serve as a reminder of the importance of cooperative policy-making through the 
WTO.  As illustrated in the previous section, if a country, such as the United States went about reducing tariffs un-
ilaterally, it would meet more resistance to this policy than if tariff reduction were done multilaterally.  Therefore, 
WTO agreements mandate new lower tariff levels at home and abroad and provide an enforce mechanism and dis-
pute settlement procedure to assure adherence to these policies.   
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Figure 1: Gains And Losses From A Tariff Decrease 
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Figure 2: Tariff Decrease With Trade Adjustment Assistance 
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Figure 3: Tariff Decrease Under Multilateral vs. Unilateral Tariff Reduction 
 
Di           D 
              D -  +  
 
                    D -  
 
 
 
    0     k(e) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   D 
             D -  
             D -  + χ 
Against      For 
